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Abstract Price comparison is a basic element of competition. For comparison to work, at least
prices need to be transparent. Moreover, price is usually a focal point in consumer thinking and
deciding on transactions. Hence, obfuscating prices can be detrimental to consumers. Therefore,
it is vital for policymakers to know how transparent pricing is in reality. Commercial practices
involving price intransparency can be detrimental to consumer decision making and may be
associated with market failure. So, legislative intervention to ensure price transparency is
sometimes warranted. Suppliers may disclose and frame pricing information in such ways as to
influence consumers. For some suppliers, advantages may be gained by obfuscating price—
through practices ranging from the outright hiding of price terms in the small print to subtle
ways of throwing in gifts or adding charges during the vending process. Do consumers
appreciate the implications of the fact that by framing price in different ways suppliers actually
try to influence their demand for products? And how does the law broadly speaking respond to
problems of price intransparency? In this article, behavioural science insights are combined
with a legal analysis of European consumer law in order to chart some of the detrimental
influences of price intransparency on the consumer decision-making process and to answer
whether and to what extent European consumer law addresses these issues. In doing so, this
article first reviews research from consumer psychology, marketing, and behavioural law, and
economics regarding the influence of presentation, framing, and transparency of price on the
consumer decision-making process. Subsequently, it describes and evaluates the legal
framework offered by European consumer law and how this framework responds to practices
of price intransparency. Particular problematic pricing techniques are identified and discussed.
In conclusion, attention is drawn to the disadvantages of the increasing full harmonization
character of European consumer law for combating price intransparency at Member State level.
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Price transparency can be considered to be one of the preconditions of the adequate
functioning of market economies. Complete price transparency facilitates comparison and
makes demand tremendously price sensitive. Therefore, suppliers may have an incentive to
make comparison more difficult by obfuscating price and making the price a “maize” as
part of their attempt at manipulating consumer preference (Carlin 2009). Such obfuscation
techniques may confuse consumers and thus raise consumer search costs (Ellison and
Fisher Ellison 2009; Ramsay 2007). The higher the search costs, the less likely consumers
are to embark upon searching and comparing price.1 Instead, they may tend towards
focusing on other propensities of the product. Moreover, inexperience in young consumers
and novelty of the marketed product may further add to the impact of obfuscation practices.
Hence, obfuscating price can be detrimental to consumers. Commercial practices
involving price intransparency can be detrimental to consumer decision making and may be
associated with market failure. For some suppliers, advantages may be gained by
obfuscating price—through practices ranging from the outright hiding of price terms in
the small print to subtle ways of throwing in gifts or adding charges during the vending
process. Consumers may not always appreciate the implications of the fact that by framing
price in different ways suppliers actually try to influence their demand for products.
For policymakers, it is vital to know how pricing practices actually work, how
consumers respond and whether the applicable legal framework in fact addresses these
pricing practices. Traditionally, in legal writing, little attention is given to these aspects.
This article fills that gap by combining behavioural science insights with legal analyses of
European consumer law. First, it reviews research from consumer psychology, marketing,
and behavioural law, and economics regarding the influence of presentation, framing, and
transparency of price on the consumer decision-making process. This review sheds light on
how consumers perceive and process price information and how suppliers make use of
these cognitive processes in the marketing and sales process. Secondly, it analyses the legal
framework set forth by European Union (EU) Directives pertaining to B2C marketing and
sales and the way this framework regulates pricing information, how it responds to
practices of price intransparency and to what extent it combats unfair pricing techniques.
Particular problematic pricing techniques are identified and discussed. In conclusion, I draw
attention to the fact that only limited room is available to EU Member States to develop
general rules on pricing transparency.
Short Typology of Consumer Thinking and Deciding
It is a trite observation that consumers are boundedly rational decision makers and that
limits to their cognitive abilities influence their thinking and deciding in making contract.
For instance, there are limitations to human information processing and working memory
(Simon 1955). By giving consumers more information, the quality of consumer decision
making does not necessarily improve. Furthermore, the ability to shape preferences is both
limited and subject to comparison and may therefore be influenced adversely when choice
increases beyond the point of saturation (Bettman et al. 1998; Markman and Loewenstein
2010; Schwartz 2004). So, focusing on a single portion of available information may be a
1 The result of adding price complexity may thus be price dispersion for essentially homogenous products.
Hence, price dispersion for such products may be a sign of market failure. Cf. Carlin (2009).
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strategic response to overcome information overload. Using mental short cuts (such as a
preferring top brands over cheaper but equally suitable alternatives, thinking that price
indicates quality, following “expert” advice given by the vendor) as well as context
(attitudes and opinions of family and peers, availability of products) may be considered a
valid coping strategy. Indeed, it seems that when the cognitive load increases (e.g., because
of complex pricing structure), individuals tend to use less of the available information
(Bettman et al. 1998; Henry 2005). All this can be summarized as follows: for
understandable reasons, rather than maximizing their utility, consumers may take on
strategies aimed at “satisficing.”
The consequence of all this may be that consumers may either undervalue or
overrate the importance of price in their decision-making process. The latter can occur
whenever consumers hold price to represent quality even when in fact price and quality
of the product may be uncorrelated (Chen et al. 2009; Hanf and von Wersebe 1994;
Kirchler et al. 2010; Sutton and Riesz 1979). The former occurs whenever context and
personal attributes cause consumers to focus on more poignant features than price. Or as
Liu and Soman state:
“Price is undoubtedly one of the most important market variables. Given the human
complexity in psychological processes and limitations in cognitive capabilities, it is
not surprising to see that traditional economic theory and normative choice models
often fall short in explaining consumer choice and consumption. This is especially
true because consumers never treat prices at their face value, but instead embed them
in a broader context and attribute meaning above and beyond the notion of the
monetary loss they create” (Liu and Soman 2008).
Still, these broad assertions on thinking and deciding in “the” consumer are in need of
further nuances. Consumers are individuals and therefore not identical; their cognitive skills
and indeed their subjectively felt need for cognition may differ: whereas some may spend
much time and effort in processing information before making decisions, others may not
bother so much and rather resort to their “fast and frugal” short cuts to speed up the
decision-making process. Perhaps the concept of consumer thinking and deciding should be
considered as a sliding scale between two opposites at the far ends. Indeed, contemporary
empirical consumer studies categorize consumers into distinct groups with different patterns
of thinking and deciding. Increasingly, consumers with a high need for cognition (NFC) and
those with a low need for cognition are distinguished. At the one end of the spectre,
consumers with high NFC enjoy the task of calculating, comparing, analysing, et cetera, in
the consumption process. At the other end, consumers with a low NFC shirk such tasks and
employ basic strategies in consumption thinking and deciding.
So, consumers are not identical but it does seem that we can roughly classify them:
some display high NFC and others a low NFC. Possibly, low NCF consumers are easier
to manipulate than high NFC consumers. For instance, observe what happens if one
puts up a display in a supermarket advertising a product as “reduced” while leaving the
price unchanged. Some consumers will actually change their choice behaviour and are
more likely to buy the item even though the price has remained unchanged. These
consumers may have a low NFC. While high NFC consumers are intrinsically
motivated to engage in cognitive endeavours, the low NFC consumers are less so
inclined. They turn out to be more likely to change their choice behaviour when the
promotion sign is used and price is unchanged. So, possibly, minimizing cognitive
processing efforts in NCF consumers affects the effective processing of price as a
singular piece of information (Inman et al. 1990, 1993).
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Means of Influencing Consumer Decision Making
“Behavioural Pricing”
There is ample knowledge on factors which influence the consumer decision-making
process. For instance, adding time pressure may distract from price information. Using pre-
ticked boxes in internet sales may cause low NCF consumers to overlook the marketing
technique of “partitioning price” (e.g., by adding on secondary products and services such
insurance, warranty extension, servicing, pretesting, gift wrapping).
It is worthwhile to briefly report here on this line of research. Some of the findings
showing these influences are based on the well-known strand of psychological research on
frames, anchors, and biases for price transparency. This line of research refutes a number of
the behavioural assumptions in standard reasoning on human information processing. Use
of these insights is made in the practice of “behavioural pricing.”2 This practice may be
used in the sales process. It involves adopting psychological insights to influence
consumption, for instance by applying the insight that individuals use a mental accounting
system to compare prices and value for money, assess affordability, etc. (Thaler 1999).
Here, some of the insights underlying “behavioural pricing” are mentioned.
Framing and Anchoring
First, there is the framing of price. For instance, the idea of description invariance holds that
rational consumers should not be influenced by the way in which price is framed and
presented. In practice, however, framing does matter. Consumer may be influenced by
cloaking a surcharge for using credit card as a rebate for using cash,3 by disguising a lump
sum as a small daily amount, or by charging €14.99 instead of €15. These pricing practices
may elicit more demand than invariance theory would predict (Liu and Soman 2008).
Likewise, there is framing through the use of promotion markers. These may be perceived
as proxies for price cuts. Framing the cut can be relevant for the behavioural impact. A
study into the differences in price perceptions when promotions were framed as either a
price discount or a gift-with-purchase showed that consumers typically preferred the off-
price promotion to the gift-with-purchase (Stanforth et al. 2001).
Secondly, there is anchoring. When the seller advertises the actual price on offer (also
referred to as the advertised reference price, ARP) in comparison with other prices—usually
the earlier selling price, the recommended retail price (RRP) or the competitor’s price—he
does so for reasons of promoting the product. By inserting a fictional retail price as a high
anchor and adding the ARP as the reduced price, the seller might artificially boost demand.
Indeed, research shows that the reservation price varies congruently with an irrelevant
anchor (Kristensen and Gärling 2000). So, if sellers provide such an irrelevant anchor, they
may influence consumption. If the comparison is factual incorrect or exaggerated, this will
inflate perceived value of the bargain and may have adverse implications for competition
(Office of Fair Trading 2005). The prohibition of the use of fictitious or irrelevant price cues
to avoid decoy anchors seems a simple tool to prevent this.
2 Furthermore, recent use of personal profiling in internet sales allows vendors to target consumers
individually with specific offers that they might like—but it could also open opportunities to adjust pricing to
consumer features and charge certain customers more than others simply because their buying profile shows
aptitude for a low NCF (Office of Fair Trading 2010b). This further complication is not dealt with here.
3 Indeed, there is some evidence that a rebate is perceived as more fair than a surcharge (Heyman and
Mellers 2008; Kimes and Wirtz 2003).
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Comparison Incompetence
Thirdly, there is the issue of relative incompetence in comparing. As far as price comparison
is concerned, studies have shown that framing a price comparison may elicit demand more
effectively if framed as preventing an avoidable loss rather than if framed as a potential gain
(Office of Fair Trading 2005).4 Other studies found that consumers are sensitive to the
extent of the discount: higher discounts tend to increase propensity to buy, perceptions of
quality and perceptions of value. Consumers were found to be most attracted to offers
framed as a high discount from the RRP whereas strangely enough the least attractive offers
were framed as high absolute savings (Office of Fair Trading 2005). In comparing prices,
the bias of “relative thinking” has proved to be a more powerful motivator than absolute
savings: a discount of €5 on a €25 object will increase demand more than a €5 saving on a
€500 object (Thaler 1980). Consumer propensity for intuition (low NCF) may exacerbate
this bias (Saini and Thota 2010).
Advertising Items as “Gifts” or “For Free”
Fourthly, there is the art of seduction through the use of cues such as “free,” “gift,” etc.
Consumers are susceptible to such cues. Therefore, by bundling the focal product with a
free gift, the vendor may cause an immediate short-term increase of demand for the product
(although the long-term effects on customer retention and brand reputation are far from
unambiguous; (Raghubir 2004)). However, the art of endowing with gifts is a subtle process
—advertising a gift may be off-putting to high NCF consumers if the communication is too
aggressive or not credible (Chandon and Chtourou 2005; Kamins et al. 2009; Office of Fair
Trading 2010a).
Bundling Items
The fifth issue concerns the bundling of products. By bundling, a seller offers two or more
products at a price which is different from the total price the consumer would pay when
buying the products separately (Epstein 2006, p. 119). Bundles may avert attention from
unit prices. If consumers have heterogeneous reservation prices for individual products,
bundling products may increase the homogeneity of reservation prices and thus increase
profitability (1+1=3; Hamilton and Srivastava 2008). Indeed, it seems that modern internet
sales techniques enable sellers to relatively easily compose personal profiles of returning
customers and on the basis of those profiles, structure the bundle to increase sales (Yang
and Lai 2006).
Locking-in the Consumer
Related to bundling is the use of price variation and locking-in (also referred to as tying in):
if consumers are drawn into long-term commercial relationships without proper knowledge
of the fact that the price of future services may be unilaterally altered (“price variation”) or
without proper understanding of the additional, sequential, and unavoidable costs, they may
find themselves locked in. Locking-in customers may happen when a product is offered
without clearly communicating or drawing explicit attention to the additional costs that
spare parts, maintenance, or accessories will impose on the consumer. For instance, by
4 On loss aversion generally (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
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presenting long-term service relationships as a single and one-off contracting decision on
single goods may distort or artificially inflate demand. The profitability of such a strategy
may depend on the proper functioning of the relevant market, on individual product
demands, bundling costs, and the nature of the relationship between the demands of the
products to be bundled (Bar-Gill 2006; Chakravarti et al. 2002; Janiszewski and Cunha
2004; McCardle et al. 2007). From the seller’s point of view, obfuscating the price of future
costs may be worthwhile. Consider the (average) cost of periodic servicing of motor
vehicles: though a relevant price consideration, consumers are not actively informed of
these costs. Once the motor vehicle is purchased, the consumer may be effectively locked in
into a long-term relationship where price variation may reign. Locking-in may thus be
especially worthwhile in experience goods which are infrequently bought (e.g., mortgages,
life insurance).
Another good example of locking-in is the market for PC printers (Bar-Gill 2008). By
keeping the purchase price of the printers low, manufacturers effectively lock in their
customers because they can only purchase ink cartridges from the manufacturer (patents
may protect the manufacturer from competitors offering cartridges at competitive prices)
and they pay a high price for the ink cartridges during the life span of the printer. By using
this concept, the profits made with the cartridges serve to cross-subsidize the artificially low
price of the printer. The consumer may be unaware of this as he is typically not informed of
the operational unit price per printed page. Therefore, he cannot compare the operational
cost of printers. Instead, the consumer is drawn into a long-term relationship with the
manufacturer by the advertised low printer price.
Price Partitioning
Finally, we need to consider the “price partitioning” technique. By partitioning, that is,
cutting up the price in the sales sequence (basic price, options, surcharges, etc.), the
consumer may be offered a false sense of autonomy. Thus, the illusion of free choice
may be created. Likewise, offering additional services may elicit choice affect in
consumers. This in turn may distract from the focus on price. Bundling products and
services decreases the salience of individual components whereas partitioning the price
may focus attention to one specific component. In essence, partitioning renders it more
difficult for consumers to preliminarily assess and compare prices. As a consequence, it
may increase demand and may cause the total price to look less expensive while
implanting the original partitioned price in consumers’ memory (Morwitz et al. 1998;
Office of Fair Trading 2010a).
Consider for instance, research on partitioning unit price and shipping charges in
online sales. First, for markets to operate efficiently, it is vital that additional costs are
transparent. If price comparison is merely possible on the basis of advertised price
while information on shipping costs, additional charges, etc., is withheld or obfuscated,
the “cheapest” supplier may turn out to be the most expensive after all, if it turns out
that he charges a ludicrous shipping and handling fee at the virtual check-out counter
(Ellison and Fisher Ellison 2009). From this point of view, statutory provisions
prescribing the use of all-inclusive prices or at least allowing comparison of total costs
are preferable.
Theory would predict that as long as additional costs are transparent, the way in which
the price is partitioned should not influence the demand for the product (principle of
descriptive invariance): whichever way the supplier partitions the price, the consumer must
pay for the total anyway. Empirical research, however, shows that the way the price is
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partitioned, does somehow influence demand. (Chakravarti et al. 2002; Tversky et al.
1988). For instance, low NFC consumers tend to pay less attention to surcharges in the
sales process than high NFC consumers (Cheema 2008). The influence of partitioning is,
however, not unambiguous. Some research suggests that partitioning has disparate effects
for high and low NFC consumers (Kim and Kramer 2006; Morwitz et al. 1998). Some
studies on the effectiveness of partitioned versus combined pricing show that for high
NFC persons, partitioned pricing has a more favourable effect than combined pricing
when the surcharges are reasonable; these effects reverse when the surcharges are
unreasonable. The studies indicate no differences between partitioned and combined
pricing across surcharge conditions for low NFC consumers (Burman and Biswas 2007).
In other words, NFC consumers may display higher demand for products sold with a
partitioned price if the surcharge is reasonable. If it is not, suppliers are well advised not
to partition.
Another method of partitioning is by framing a unit price in “pennies-a-day:” by
showing how much a product effectively costs per day (temporal partitioning) the seller
systematically fosters the retrieval and consideration of small ongoing expenses as the
standard of comparison, whereas an aggregate framing of that same transaction is shown to
foster the retrieval and consideration of large and infrequent expenses. This difference in
retrieval is shown to significantly influence subsequent transaction evaluation and
compliance (Gourville 1998). Another study showed that consumers prefer partitions that
allocate a larger proportion of the total price to components perceived as providing high
benefits to partitions that allocate a larger proportion of the total price to components
perceived as providing low benefits (Hamilton and Srivastava 2008). The technique of
making consumers focus on the “pennies-a-day” price is well-known in consumer credit. If
left unregulated, lenders have shown to obfuscate the price of credit by stressing the amount
of monthly instalments rather than the overall interest (cf. Bertrand and Morse 2009; White
2007). This technique helps to frame the proposition favourably and to anchor the
borrower’s thinking—rather than considering the total amount in interest he might focus on
the periodic payments and their consistency with his budgetary constraints.
The European Legal Framework
In the previous section, I considered some means of influencing perceptions and
valuations of price. The way in which price is framed, stimulating certain anchors,
exploiting the inability to compare, cueing through the use of words such as “free gift,”
clever use of bundling and locking-in mechanisms, as well as price partitioning, are just
some of the commercial practices used to influence the consumer decision-making
process and to boost demand. The question is: are these practices legitimate ways of
promoting sales or do they significantly distort the consumer decision-making process
so as to justify legislative intervention? Surely not all means of influencing consumer
thinking and deciding by fogging over their vision warrant legislative intervention. A
certain level of intransparency and obfuscation will have to be tolerated and will be
eradicated by the market itself.5 Furthermore, in some markets, dubious pricing practices
are somehow accepted as part and parcel of that particular market. For instance, consumer
5 Cf. Office of Fair Trading (2010a) p. 100 ff., where reference is made to the learning abilities in consumers.
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habituation to price obfuscation may decrease the distortive effects of such unfair
practices. Nowadays, high NCF consumers would be nothing less than utterly vigilant
not to be tricked when booking with certain budget airlines. That said, the more subtle
and misleading an obfuscatory practice may be, the louder the call for regulatory
intervention may be.
Hence, a closer look at the regulatory framework for evaluating price transparency
currently in force in European consumer law is appropriate. This framework consists of
two parts. On the one hand, there are concrete rule-based provisions on price which are
mainly to be found in the 1998 Unit Prices Directive.6 On the other hand, there are
principle-based duties which are mainly to be found in the 2005 Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive,7 and the 2008 Draft Consumer Rights Directive.8 Together, these
European rules make up the regulatory framework for judging price transparency. The
question here is whether and to what extent the European legal framework addresses the
implications of the existing practices by which vendors attempt to influence perceptions
and valuations of price. In dealing with this question, I will briefly refer to some national
case law—notably German case law—to illustrate the judicial application of the rules laid
down in the aforementioned Directives.9 The review of case law is by no means
exhaustive but merely illustrative.
Specific Rules on Pricing
The 1998 Unit Prices Directive is based on the notion of price transparency through the
establishment of common principles for indicating prices. This is considered to be the
easiest way to enable consumers to evaluate and compare the price of products in an
optimal manner and make informed choices on the basis of simple comparisons (preamble;
recital 6; art. 1). The Directive sets forth the following basic rules for retail sales:
& Products should be offered with a selling price (the final price for a unit or a given
quantity of the product, including VAT and all other taxes).
& Where applicable a unit price (the final price, including VAT and all other taxes, for
1 kh, 1 l, 1 m, etc.) should be communicated unless unit price and selling price are
identical.
& The selling price and the unit price must be unambiguous, easily identifiable and clearly
legible.
Though non-compliance with these information requirements is considered an unfair
commercial practice,10 the scope of these requirements is quite narrow. Moreover, the
Directive is of a minimum harmonization character and allows Member States to exempt
certain products. For instance, the obligation to display the unit price may be waived if
6 Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer
protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers (OJ L 080/27).
7 Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 (OJ L 149/22) (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). See also art.
22 Services Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L
376/36). Art. 22 sets forth the duty to give unambiguous and timely information on the price or the
calculation method used to determine the price.
8 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, COM(2008)
614 final.
9 For further examples predating the 2005 UCP Directive, see Schulze and Schulte-Nölke (2003).
10 Article 7 (5) and Annex II of the 2005 UCP Directive.
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the Member State considers it impractical or confusing.11 In case law, the following
practices have been considered contrary to the Unit Prices Directive: putting discounted
products on offer as “20% off” without displaying the final selling price,12 advertising
soft drinks for sale in a deposit bottle without mention of the deposit,13 advertising
kitchen towels with a unit price per kilogramme.14
Given their basic and straightforward nature, the transparency requirements under the
1998 Unit Prices Directive do not explicitly tackle all transparency issues such as bundling
or locking-in. The Directive effectively orders supermarkets to display the price of, say,
apples per kilogramme (the unit price) while there is no such mechanism to guarantee “per
unit” transparency in lock-in bundles (e.g., expected price per printed page in printers rather
than the “unit” of the printer itself).
Moreover, the 1998 Unit Prices Directive does not seem to prevent persistent practices of
so-called partitioning of prices. Some of these practices were so persistent that policy-
makers at EU level enacted specific regulation to address the detrimental effects caused by
these practices. A case in point is the online sale of budget airline tickets. For some time,
the partitioning technique was popular in online air flight tickets. To counter the
obfuscatory practices, specific rules on pricing transparency in air travel services were
promulgated in 2008. Currently, article 23 of the Air Services Regulation 1008/2008
provides that the final price shall include “unavoidable and foreseeable” fees, taxes, etc.15
Furthermore, optional price supplements are to be “communicated in a clear, transparent
and unambiguous way at the start of any booking process and their acceptance by the
customer shall be on an ‘opt-in’ basis.” A crucial addition in article 23 is that the final price
to be paid “shall at all times be indicated.” This is an important step towards true
transparency because the 1998 Unit Prices Directive does not prohibit the sequential
partitioning of the final price by drawing consumers with a basic price while adding on
unavoidable and foreseeable charges at a later stage in the online sales sequence. The Air
Services Regulation does in fact address the partitioning issue and one could consider
whether perhaps this particular element of article 23 merits broader application to all B2C
transactions.
The UCP Directive and Price Transparency
The principle-based framework of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP) Directive
seems more encompassing then the specific rules analysed above. However, the UCP
Directive aims at full harmonization and leaves little room to Member States to promulgate
specific rules on price transparency.16 As we will see later on, this may hamper rather than
promote consumer protection. In fact, implementation of the UCP Directive necessitated
Member States to repeal much of their specific domestic rules on pricing information
(Howells et al. 2006). Some Member States had to repeal regulations on compulsory price
displays for hair salons, others had to do away with rules on mandatory lists of at least 30
11 Article 5 of the 1998 Unit Prices Directive. A list of national exceptions is to be found at EIM Business
and Policy Research (2004) 137.
12 BGH 25 February 1999, Case I ZR 4/97, GRUR 1999, p. 762 ("Herabgesetzte Schlussverkaufspreise");
for a similar decision, see BGH 11 April 1991, Case I ZR 166/89, GRUR 1991, 685 (“Zirka-Preisangabe”).
13 BGH 14 October 1993, Case I ZR 218/91, GRUR 1994, 222 ("Flaschenpfand").
14 BGH 21 May 1992, Case I ZR 141/90, GRUR 1992, 856 (“Kilopreise IV”).
15 Cf. BGH 17 October 1980, Case I ZR 132/78, GRUR 1981, 140 ("Flughafengebühr").
16 E.g., the English Consumer Protection (Code of Practice for Traders on Price Indications) Approval Order
2005 may be in conflict in certain respects with the full harmonization character of the 2005 UCP Directive.
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different drinks in pubs (cf. Williams and Hare 2010, p. 383 fn 12). So, in some Member
States the 2005 UCP Directive has relaxed existing price transparency regimes instead of
tightening them.
First, let us have a closer look at the 2005 UCP regime. The Directive is applicable to unfair
commercial practices, i.e., those practices contrary to the requirements of professional diligence
whichmaterially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average
(targeted) consumer with regard to the product (article 5). The concept of “unfair” is further
subcategorized into misleading and aggressive practices. Misleading practices are those which
either
(1) contain false information and are therefore untruthful or in any way deceive or are
likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct,
which thus cause distortion of the transactional decision-making process of this
average consumer in relation to certain aspects such as, e.g., the existence or nature of
the product, fitness for purpose, usage, quantity, specification, the price or the manner
in which the price is calculated, the need for a service, part, replacement or repair, etc.
(article 6 (1)),
or
(2) omit, hide, provide in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous, or untimely manner
material information that the average (targeted) consumer needs, according to the
context, to take an informed transactional decision and thus cause distortion of the
transactional decision-making process of this average consumer (article 7).
Furthermore, Annex I to the Directive consists of a “black list” of certain practices
deemed unfair under any circumstances (article 5 (5)). For instance, outright unfair is a
commercial practice “describing a product as ‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar, if
the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the
commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item” (Annex I, no. 20).17
Moreover, the UCP Directive provides that in a so-called “invitation to purchase” (which
basically is a retail offer comprising basic information on the product and price), the price
information should be presented as “the price inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of the
product means that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the manner in
which the price is calculated, as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery
or postal charges or, where these charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the
fact that such additional charges may be payable.”18
What are the consequences of the UCP regime for pricing transparency? The short and
easy answer is that information on price shall be truthful and non-misleading, thus allowing
the average consumer to make an informed transactional decision. However, the more
extensive answer is rather more complex.
Vulnerable Consumers and “Easy Cases” under the UCP Directive
First, one should look whether the product is targeted at a particular group of consumers.
When a commercial practice is specifically aimed at a particular group of consumers, such
17 For other examples, see, e.g., Ramsay (2007) p. 313.
18 Cf. art. 5 (1) (c) Draft Consumer Rights Directive (COM (2008) 614 final). Note that the art. 22 (3) (a)
Services Directive (2006/123/EC) gives a slightly different wording by obliging the service provider to
supply, at the recipient’s request, “where the price is not pre-determined by the provider for a given type of
service, the price of the service or, if an exact price cannot be given, the method for calculating the price so
that it can be checked by the recipient, or a sufficiently detailed estimate.”
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as children, it is desirable that the impact of the commercial practice is assessed from the
perspective of the average member of that group (recital 18). So, if a trader avails himself of
a glossy advertising leaflet to entice young girls to enter the “Pony Club”—that is, a long-
term subscription to a periodical—and the front of the leaflet states the price of the
“welcome pack” but the (higher) price of subsequent dispatches is only mentioned in the
small print on the back of the subscription form, then a court may hold that this way of
marketing a product is unfair as it withholds easily accessible price information.19
Then, there are the “easy” cases. Generally, the UCP framework prohibits the use of
incorrect or exaggerated comparison prices as misleading (e.g., illusionary RRP).20 Bogus
cues—for instance, advertising a price as “slashed” while it isn’t (e.g., summer sales
reduced prices turning out to be identical to just before or after the sales period)—are
misleading as well.21 Similarly, raising the price of the entire range of products on offer just
before displaying “20% off all products” will probably also count as unfair.22
Behavioural Pricing and the Average Consumer
Rather more difficult to assess is the matter of influencing the average consumer by
subtly obfuscating price.23 If information on price is made available to the consumer but
in a somewhat concealed way, how would that affect the average consumer? In the “Pony
Club” example, imagine that this sales technique is used in a product marketed for the
general adult population. Would that count as a case of unfair obfuscation of price? On
the one hand, the “reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”
consumer can be expected to make a serious effort at collecting and understanding all
available information on an essential aspect such as price.24 On the other hand, the UCP
framework aims at giving traders an incentive to give price information in a clear,
intelligible, unambiguous, and timely fashion. The tenure of the UCP Directive seems to
be that whether a given technique of price obfuscation is actually an unfair commercial
practice must be decided from case to case by national courts and enforcers (with some
level of overlooking by the ECJ). There is however little room for national legislatures to
make their own “black list” of unfair pricing practices by fully and generally banning
these practices. So, a national list stating that “promotional material shall always mention
the price of subscription on the front” would run counter to the full harmonization nature
of the Directive. For this reason, the ECJ is keen on stamping out the use of additional
national “black lists.”25
19 Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH) 8 July 2008 (file 4Ob57/08y).
20 European Commission (2009) 34.
21 E.g., Collins (2005) p. 422 ; Köhler and Bornkamm (2010) para 5, no. 6.5.
22 OFT v The Officers Club Limited and David Charlton [2005] EWHC 1080 (Ch.) (“70% off”); BGH 20
November 2008, Case I ZR 122/06, GRUR 2009, p. 788 (“20% auf alles”). Cf. Ramsay (2007) p. 315 ff.
23 On the concept of “average consumer” and how to identify him, see, e.g., European Commission,
Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices (SEC
(2009)1666), Brussels: European Commission (2009) pp. 27–28, pp. 32–33; Willett (2010) pp. 269–271;
Gomez (2006) pp. 26–27; Weatherill (2006) p. 115 ff.
24 ECJ 16 July 1998, C-210/96 (Gut Springenheide); ECJ 19 September 2006, C-356/04 (Lidl and Colruyt);
cf. ECJ 6 July 1995, C-470/93, Jur. 1995 p. I-01923 (Mars).
25 ECJ April 23, 2009, cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 (VTB-VAB NV v. Total Belgium NV/Galatea BVBAv.
Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV): national legislation which prohibits the bundling of products by
“combined offer,” without taking account of the specific circumstances, is inconsistent with the UCP
Directive. Cf. ECJ March, 11, 2010, case C-522/08 (Telekomunikacja Polska SA w Warszawie v. Prezes
Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej).
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Is Causing Price Intransparency through Bundling a UCP?
This raises the question to what extent the more sophisticated methods of price obfuscation,
such as bundling and partitioning, are prohibited under the UCP framework. Is bundling a
free product with another product allowed? Though in principle the answer is affirmative,
such an offer may sometimes amount to an unfair commercial practice. “Describing a
product as ‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar if the consumer has to pay anything
other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or
paying for delivery of the item” is deemed unfair (Annex I, no. 20). Though clear at first
glance, at a closer look this prohibition is rather problematic. It seems only to relate to
stand-alone offers and not to affect the bundling of multiple products of which one is free.
Nor does it seem to apply to offers such as “buy one get one free” or “3 for 2.” Hence, the
ambit of this prohibition is rather limited. It does not seem to have any relevance in cases in
which a product is advertised for “€0.00*” where the asterisk refers to small print or where
small printed statements such as “terms and conditions apply” is used. If it were to apply to
those practices, some sales methods would be rendered illegal—for instance used in
advertising long term mobile telephone contracts by luring customers with a “free” mobile
phone. It seems that such practices are not covered by Annex I, no. 20. Likewise, offering a
bonus with a purchase may not be generally prohibited by Member States: a national
provision which lays down a general prohibition on sales with bonuses is inconsistent with
the full harmonization character of the UCP Directive.26 For the same reason, seducing
consumers by offering a free participation in a lottery if they purchase some product, may
not be outright prohibited.27
Bundling with “free” items may nevertheless amount to a misleading practice in concrete
cases if the actual price is not provided in a clear, intelligible, and unambiguous or timely
manner. For instance, in German case law, the practice of advertising a mobile telephone
tariff on a large billboard at “0.00 monthly fee*” where the asterisk referred to small print
stating a considerable contract fee, minimum number of monthly calls, minimum contract
running period, was considered an intransparent pricing technique that added up to an
unfair commercial practice.28 One could also look at it from another angle by stating, as
does Section 4 (4) of the German Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), that a
person acts unfair if he “does not clearly and unambiguously communicate the applicable
conditions of sales promotions such as rebates, premiums or free gifts.”29 Therefore, one
could conclude that the conditions of the bundle should be communicated clearly and
unambiguously.
So, bundling as such is not forbidden by the UCP framework as long as the total price is
transparent. The UCP Directive does not oblige the trader to disclose the value of the
singular units in the bundle. So, a general national rule on mandatory disclosure of unit
26 ECJ November 9, 2010, case C 540/08 (Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG v.
‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag GmbH).
27 ECJ January 14, 2010, case C-304/08 (Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V. v. Plus
Warenhandelsgesellschaft GmbH).
28 BGH 22 April 2009, Case I ZR 14/07 (“0,00 Grundgebühr”). A similar high level of transparency was
required according to BGH 17 July 2008, Case I ZR 139/05, GRUR 2009, p. 73 (“Telefonieren für 0 Cent!”).
Moreover, if the reference omits to mention material price information, the advertised price is misleading a
fortiori: BGH 2 June 2005, Case I ZR 252/02, GRUR 2006, p. 164 (Aktivierungskosten II).
29 See Keirsbilck (2009) 522 for the question whether the German UWG is in conformity with the maximum
harmonisation character of the UCP Directive.
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prices in a bundled offer would seem contrary to the UCP framework. Yet, German case law
holds that if the bundle interferes with the consumer’s perception in the sense that it
confuses or insufficiently informs him of the price of the actual offer, the trader is under the
duty to inform the consumer transparently.30
Is Partitioning Price a UCP?
The UCP Directive is not really clear on the extent to which partitioning of price is
allowed. In invitations to purchase the price information is to be presented as “the price
inclusive of taxes (…) as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or
postal charges (…)” (article 7 (4) (c)). This does not explicitly deal with the issue of
“chopping up” the price in sequential parts in the sales process. Obviously, in some
cases traders have a clear and justified interest in partitioning. For instance, partitioning
the price of a holiday home into a fixed rent and variable charges for utilities may be
fully justified under the condition that the partitions are clearly communicated.31 In
other cases, though, the justification for partitioning may be completely absent. The
practice of chopping up the price as currently dealt with in the Air Services Regulation
1008/2008 is persistent in other markets as well. So, is an internet shop still allowed to
advertise a PC as costing €499 while adding a further €50 in “handling costs” during the
sales process? Neither the UCP Directive nor the Unit Prices Directive addresses this
issue—therefore, it will depend on the specifics of a given case whether such partitioning
can be considered presenting price information in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or
untimely manner.
Somewhat similar to partitioning is the practice of using pre-ticked boxes which
consumers have to untick to avoid adding on secondary services to the primary product.
Article 31 (3) of the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights (“Transparency requirements of
contract terms”) combats pre-ticked boxes by providing: “The trader shall seek the
express consent of the consumer to any payment in addition to the remuneration foreseen
for the trader’s main contractual obligation. If the trader has not obtained the consumer’s
express consent but has inferred it by using default options which the consumer is
required to reject in order to avoid the additional payment, the consumer shall be entitled
to reimbursement of this payment.” Obviously, article 31 does not apply to those options
that cannot be unticked so it does not deal with the practice of first partitioning price and
then adding unavoidable charges in the sequence of the selling process. What it may
positively deal with, though, is inflated sales of add-on insurance, warranty extensions,
super delivery charges, etc. In offline retail, the sale of such add-on products can develop
worrying proportions. A case in point concerns add-on insurance policies which are
offered as a secondary product with credit card loans, consumer electronics and cell
phones. The marketing technique employed to sell add-on insurance in consumer
electronics for instance is rather sophisticated: as soon as the consumer has decided to buy
the product, he is offered the opportunity to buy additional insurance to protect his newly
acquired property.32 Given that he has just been endowed with property, he may then not
be able to objectively weigh the premium cost against the probability of loss. This may in
30 BGH 13 June 2002, Case I ZR 173/01, GRUR 2002, p. 976, BGHZ 151, p. 84 (Koppelungsangebot I);
BGH 13 June 2002, Case I ZR 71/01, GRUR 2002, 979 (Koppelungsangebot II).
31 BGH 6 June 1991, Case I ZR 291/89, GRUR 1991, 845 (“Nebenkosten Ferienwohnung”).
32 Similar techniques are applied in the sale of extended warranties in consumer products.
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fact influence his willingness to avoid the loss and it may even influence the insured’s
willingness to obtain additional information on the terms of the contract (either at the
counter or afterwards if a termination clause or cooling-off period applies). Admittedly,
the proposition of these causative mechanisms is speculative and deserves empirical
investigation but the research that is available does show that the claims/premium ratio in
some of these add-on insurance policies may be hugely disadvantageous for consumers.
This implies that there is a structural market failure in operation in these particular
markets (Van Boom 2008).33
Perhaps a similar mechanism is in operation in online sales by use of pre-ticked boxes
that pop up at the virtual check-out counter—though the pressure and persuasion applied by
salesmen in the face-to-face offline buying experience will be more substantial than in an
online equivalent. In this respect, by forbidding pre-ticked boxes policymakers may help to
prevent the artificially inflated sales of add-on products. If the trader wants an additional
remuneration beside the primary price, the Draft Consumer Rights Directive demands that
explicit consent is obtained from the buyer.34
Undoubtedly, there are numerous sales techniques available to circumvent the
prohibition of pre-ticked boxes as proposed by the Draft Consumer Rights Directive (EC
2008). What if the trader raises the price and offers a rebate if the add-on products are
bought? And what if certain boxes cannot be unticked? If a trader offers a holiday
accommodation rental only in combination with a liability insurance, does article 31 (4)
prohibit the partitioning of this unavoidable extra cost from the rent itself? If that is indeed
the consequence of article 31, it might lead to less transparency in the sense that it induces
traders to merely present the total price rather than the price of the modules that build up the
product. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent article 31—assuming it
will be part of the final Directive—will indeed lead to the desired result of safeguarding
explicit consent and thus increasing consumer autonomy.
Appraisal
In this article, I reviewed behavioural sciences research to chart some of the influences
of price intransparency on the consumer decision-making process. Next, I analysed how
the European legal framework responds to some practices of price intransparency. It
emerged that European consumer law seems to address the more straightforward
misleading pricing practices—such as using a fictitious anchor price—but fails to
explicitly address the more subtle obfuscatory practices that are implied in certain
bundling practices and certain price partitioning techniques. The question is whether
such practices warrant legislative intervention. From the outset, it does not seem
appropriate to prohibit all forms of bundling and partitioning as such. Some markets,
however, may be more problematic than others. For example, policymakers at the
European level considered the online sales techniques of some budget airlines so
disruptive as to warrant intervention in pricing practices. This leads me to reflect further
on the relationship between the notion of “average consumer,” the increasing full
33 OFT (1997) p. 1 ff. Possibly, one of the causes for this unbalance is a combination of information
asymmetry on the actual need for such insurance and the “endowment effect” on the side of the insured. Note
that the endowment effect and its extent are debated. See, e.g., Zeiler and Plott (2005) p. 530 ff.
34 EC (2008) pp. 17–18, recital no. 47.
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harmonization character of European consumer law and the combat of specific practices
of price intransparency deemed unfair at Member State level.
It seems there is a tension between insights from behavioural science and the normative
concept of the average consumer, given the full harmonization principle of the UCP
Directive. The normative notion of “average consumer” makes it unlikely that judicial and
legislative efforts will be devoted to researching how consumers actually think and decide
and perceive price information (Incardona and Poncibò 2007). However, the growing body
of empirical research does offer invaluable insights in actual thinking and deciding
concerning price. This line of research analyses the influence of the way in which price is
framed, how sales techniques can stimulate certain anchors, exploit the inability to
compare, give subliminal cues through the use of words such as “free gift,” how clever use
of bundling and locking-in mechanisms as well as price partitioning may influence the
consumer decision-making process. In doing so, researchers at times distinguish between
high and low NCF consumers and they find diverging decision-making strategies in these
two “types” of the “average consumer.”
The insights from empirical research can be used by national courts and enforcement
agencies to fine tune the use of legal instruments already available in European
consumer law. Though empirical research can hardly substitute the normative concept of
“average consumer,” it can help to identify and address the cognitive fallacies that
consumers may fall prey to, and that distort their market behaviour. Price transparency
is important for markets to function. Both the 1998 Unit Prices Directive and the 2005
UCP Directive lay down rules on transparency and to some extent they tackle clear
cases of obfuscation—for instance, comparisons with untruthful RRP’s and decoy cues
are prohibited. More complex sales techniques such as the partitioning of price and
bundling of offers are not dealt with in a straightforward way. Courts and national
enforcement authorities are to judge every case on its own merits and decide whether
the pricing technique used is a misleading commercial practice in the given circum-
stances. National legislatures are not allowed to outright ban such techniques without
having regard for the particular situation in which the technique is applied. All in all,
this seems a correct approach. Subtle sales techniques as such cannot be considered
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence under all circumstances—a
flexible approach is therefore in order. The drawback of this approach is undoubtedly
that the hands of national policymakers are tied when it comes to combating specific
sales techniques in specific areas. If policymakers in country X would feel that the
widespread practice of partitioning price in a specific market is detrimental to consumer
confidence in that specific market, they would nevertheless lack the powers to ban that
particular practice, or so it seems.
A similar problem arises when we look at pricing regulations aimed at giving consumers
a better understanding of the long-term implications of their purchase. It seems that the full
harmonization character of the UCP Directive is not easily reconciled with regulations on
“meaningful pricing,” for instance regulations that would order suppliers of home printers
to advertise an “average price per printed page” rather than merely the unit price of the
printer itself. Perfect price transparency allows comparing offers of multiple suppliers.
Hence, transparency amounts to more than mere calculus. It must be meaningful
transparency. If indeed the full harmonization character of the UCP Directive does not
allow the development of such rules on “meaningful price transparency,” then perhaps the
UCP Directive stifles rather than fosters innovation in the context of consumer
empowerment.
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